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I. INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
There is a growing trend to limit the rights of intellectual property
owners when the public interest warrants. Until very recently', this
phenomenon has been manifested only at a transnational level. For
example, the World Trade Organization, as recently as November 2001, in
its Doha Agreement ("Doha"),2 enabled certain nations of the Asian and
African subcontinents to obtain compulsory licenses to manufacture and
distribute domestically certain anti-retroviral drugs by declaring a state of
national health emergency. This particular intrusion into patent rights,
being limited to developing countries that could not afford to pay for anti-
AIDS medication at normal commercial rates, was accomplished with the
assent of the multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers which are active
in the development and manufacture of such drugs. In the absence of such
an international agreement, the public health consequences in the countries
affected were too horrific to contemplate. Doha therefore represented an
important legal breakthrough: the international community effectively
agreed that the protection of intellectual property, even when valuable
*The author is a competition partner at DLA in Brussels, Belgium and was lead counsel
to NDC Health in the Brussels proceedings described in this article, as well as co-counsel to
NDC in proceedings before the EC Court of First Instance.
1 See Media Release No. 33, Competition Commission of South Africa, Competition
Commission Concludes an Agreement with Pharmaceutical Firm (Dec. 16, 2003)(Indicating
that the South African Commission had reached a settlement with GlaxoSmithKline
regarding allegations of abuse of dominant position by refusal to license patents in certain
anti-retroviral drugs. On the date of this writing, the Commission's settlement negotiations
with Boehringer Ingelheim are still in progress.), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/
resources/Media%20Releases/MediaReleases%202003/JulUMed%2ORel%2034%200fI 6%20
Dec%202003.asp.
2 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.
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patent rights are involved, may, in extreme circumstances, be outweighed
by public health interests. However, Doha raises an intriguing question: if
limited intrusions into valuable intellectual property rights may be justified
on public health grounds, should not such intrusions into intellectual
property also be tolerated, and indeed encouraged, in order to safeguard
other public interests, in particular, the maintenance of competition? There
is currently a stormy debate on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether
compulsory licensing, on antitrust grounds, is an appropriate means of
breaking monopolies that owe their existence, to a large extent, to the
ownership of valuable intellectual property. The U.S. antitrust enforcers
under the Bush Administration seem to be quite uncomfortable with such a
development.3 On the other hand, there is a division among U.S. federal
courts on the justifiability of compulsory licensing on antitrust grounds,4
but there is no indication that the U.S. Supreme Court will settle the matter
any time soon. In the European Union, the question is not whether the
European Commission ("Commission") and European Courts support the
notion of compulsory licensing on antitrust grounds, but rather how far
these institutions are willing to go to defend competition against the
interests of intellectual property owners.
By the time this article appears in print, the Commission will have
taken a number of significant steps to solidify its doctrinal commitment to
compulsory licensing. The Commission will probably have established its
internal guidelines for dealing with essential facilities cases, including those
having intellectual property aspects. It will also probably be in the
advanced stages of its investigation against Microsoft, in which the latter
has been accused of abusing its dominant position under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty by having withheld access to proprietary protocols for making
low-end servers compatible with Windows operating systems software.
Finally, the Commission should probably have a few additional
investigations of this genre in its pipeline. The Commission's decision in
NDC Health/IMS Health,5 which was reached in July 2001 and
subsequently suspended in the EC Court of First Instance 6 and Court of
3 See, e.g., R. Hewitt Pate, Speech before the American Intellectual Property Association
on Antitrust and Intellectual Property (Jan. 24, 2003)(decrying the application of the
essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property). But see U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(1995), at paras. 2.1-2.2; see also Intel Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9288 (June 8, 1998)
(complaint).
4 See generally Robert Pitofsky et al, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S.
Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002).
5 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18.
6 See Case 184/01RI, IMS Health v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-2349 (ex parte order);
Case T-184/01R2, IMS Health v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193 (after oral hearing).
European Community Compulsory Licensing Policy
24:619 (2004)
Justice,7 far from causing the Commission to retreat from the issue of
compulsory licensing, instead provided doctrinal justification for the
Commission to impose intellectual property licenses in appropriate cases.
For preceding reasons, it is an opportune time to comment upon a number
of issues, which remain unsettled at the E.U. level in the hope that the
Commission will confront these issues directly in the coming months.
II. HERESY VERSUS COMMON SENSE
In the European Union and in the United States, compulsory licensing
of intellectual property on antitrust grounds did not develop as an extension
of Doha. To the contrary, such licensing in the antitrust context pre-dates
Doha. In the European Union, for example, the first case imposing a
compulsory license under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (abuse of dominant
position) was the Magill decision of 1988.8 In fact, the case law on
compulsory licensing developed from an earlier strain of cases dealing with
essential facilities in the traditional sense, that is, when the "facility" in
question is physical infrastructure of some kind, such as a bridge or a port.
One might posit, given the time honored tendency of policy precedents to
broaden in scope, that it was only a matter of time before incorporeal rights
were held subject to the same or similar scrutiny as physical infrastructure.
Doha phenomenon is relevant to the issue of compulsory licensing in
the antitrust context. The Doha confirmed that intellectual property rights
are not sacrosanct and that where, in limited circumstances, the interests of
intellectual property owners are outweighed by other public interests, there
should be legal scope to accommodate these latter interests.
An interesting question is whether, as Doha might be considered to
suggest, intellectual property has become a more potent technological and
economic force than it was forty years ago. Just as the compulsory
licensing of certain pharmaceutical patents is now necessary in order to
save millions of AIDS victims in the developing world, we seem to have
entered an era in which intellectual property owners more generally are now
able to use their intellectual property rights not only to exclude competitors
from entering the market in which the exercise of intellectual property was
originally intended, but also to extend their monopoly into neighboring
markets. To cite just one example of how the intellectual property playing
field has changed, by denying access to "intellectual property protected"
(but indispensable) interfaces or protocols, intellectual property owners are
able to prevent the products of competitors from being "interoperable" with
7 Case 481/01P(R)1, NDC Health v. IMS Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401.
8 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43, aff'don appeal; Case T-69/89, RTE v. Comm'n,
1991 E.C.R. 11-485; Case T-76/89, ITP v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575; Case T-70/89, BBC
v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-535, aff'd on appeal; Cases C-241 and 242/91P, RTE v.
Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743.
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other parts of an integrated system which functions on the basis of such
interfaces and protocols, thereby making the products of competitors
unmarketable. To face this new intellectual property challenge, antitrust
regulators have a clear choice: they can reflexively uphold the historical
integrity of intellectual property rights over all other contravening (and
arguably supervening) interests, with the effect that they are impotent to
confront such abusive uses of intellectual property rights by monopolists, or
they can adapt their conventional thinking on intellectual property in order
to deal with such use of intellectual property rights to achieve market
foreclosure.
Seen in this light, the E.U. position on compulsory licensing, far from
being heretical, represents a serious, common sense effort to address the
complex issue of market foreclosure arising from the assertion of
intellectual property rights. The criticism of E.U. policy on compulsory
licensing, whether from the United States or other quarters, has been based
mostly on perceived fears of intellectual property dilution.9 But as a
practical matter, the dilution of intellectual property would depend upon the
frequency with which the Commission has imposed compulsory licenses,
whether it has devised a legal test which is inherently suspect, or whether,
in specific cases, it has adhered to rigorous standards in determining
whether applicants are entitled to a license or imposed terms which are no
more burdensome than necessary to permit the licensee a reasonable market
entry. So far there is no evidence of intellectual property dilution by any of
the above means.
The issue of intellectual property dilution may also be addressed more
fundamentally by posing the question whether any antitrust-imposed limits
on intellectual property constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the rights
of the intellectual property owner. As a matter of EC competition law
going back for almost forty years, there is an important distinction made
between the "existence" of intellectual property and how it is "exercised."' 10
The case law of the European Court has confirmed that, pursuant to
Article 295, the Commission may not interfere with determinations as to
whether a work is protected intellectual property, but that it may impose
limits on how intellectual property rights are exercised when such exercise
conflicts with other countervailing interests that are protected by the EC
Treaty. Thus, for example, the use of trademarks to partition national
markets has been viewed as a violation of Article 81. More on point, it is
well established that Article 81 prohibits groups of manufacturers from
9 See, e.g., Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust:
The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 811 (2001); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J.
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1219 (1999).
1o See Case T-76/89, ITP v. Comnm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575.
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adopting "closed" industry standards, even when they are protected.,
1
In Magill,12 the Court confirmed that the Commission's use of
Article 82, in exceptional circumstances, to compel the sharing of one's
intellectual property rights with others reflects a similar deference to the
Treaty over national intellectual property concerns. The Court framed the
issue as a balancing of interests: there must be a strong enough antitrust
concern to justify intrusions into the exercise of intellectual property
rights. 13 The Court held that the impeded access to essential intellectual
property is one of those antitrust concerns.1 4 Indeed, in the absence of
compulsory licensing under Article 82, there appears to be no effective
means of breaking bottleneck monopolies that are perpetuated by the
unilateral refusal of access to "essential" intellectual property.
III. THE "BAD COPYRIGHT" RED HERRING
It remains the case that the Commission has not applied Article 82 to
compel an intellectual property license of anything more than banal
material, the creation of which involved neither originality nor significant
investment.' 5  In Magill, the British Parliament, in the 1956 Copyright
Act, 16 conferred on broadcasters an automatic copyright in their daily
television listings. Whereas in IMS, the Frankfurt Regional Court held that
IMS owned a valid copyright in an amalgamation of German postal codes
known as the 1860 brick structure. 17  If it were the Commission's
enforcement policy to limit licenses to such commonplace material, this
would undoubtedly placate some observers, who view the application of
essential facilities theory to valuable intellectual property as antithetical to
the very essence of intellectual property rights.1
8
11 See, e.g., MPEG-2 Licensing Programme, 1998 OJ (C 229) 19 (closed by comfort
letter in Press Release IP/98/1155); DVD Patent Licensing Programme, 1999 OJ (C 242) 5
(closed by comfort letter in Press Release IP/00/1 135).
12 Cases C-241-242/91P, RTE v. Comm'n, 1995 ECR 1-743.
13 Id. at para. 50 (the Court's test of "exceptional circumstances" must be interpreted in
this light).
14 Id. at para. 56.
15 The Magill and IMS cases are the only two cases in which the Commission, until now,
has compelled access to intellectual property. Each case involved material of nominal (if
any) originality or intellectual value, over which a national legislature or court had conferred
a copyright.
16 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz 2, c.74, repeal (Eng.).
17 Case 3 0 539/00 (preliminary injunction of October 27, 2000) (confirming injunction
of November 16, 2000), appeal denied, Case 11 U 66/00 (June 19, 2001); Case 3 0 283/00
(judgment on the merits for IMS on October 12, 2000), rev'd, Case 11 U 67/00 (Sept. 17,
2002).
18 See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 9, at 1219; Venit & Kallaugher, Essential Facilities:
A Comparative Law Approach, 1994 FORDHAM L. INST. 315, 337.
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It might well be the case, as one commentator has noted, that Magill
provided the Commission with the means to impose a compulsory license
under Article 82 when the very intellectual property at issue is banal, does
not involve any costly investment and, for these reasons, is arguably
undeserving of such protection.' 9 However, as the same commentator
rightly notes, nothing in Magill or in the previous non-intellectual property
case law on essential facilities, has limited compulsory licensing to such
narrow circumstances. 20 Similarly, the Commission's interim decision in
the IMS case is devoid of such an express limitation on the application of
Article 82. If the Commission and EC Courts had wished to limit the
application of Article 82 in the compulsory licensing setting to banal
copyright-protected works, they could have done so explicitly in either or
both of these cases. One may more reasonably adduce from these two cases
that the Commission, like any other antitrust enforcement agency, prefers to
be confronted by a non-controversial factual situation when deciding a
watershed case. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that the Commission
has imposed an internal hands-off policy with regard to imposing
compulsory licenses when valuable copyrights and patents are involved.
The assertion that Article 82 may be used as a pretext for the Commission
to attack intellectual property rights lacks any foundation. Any attempt on
the part of the Commission to qualify or disinherit intellectual property
rights granted by a Member State would constitute an infringement of
Article 295 of the EC Treaty, unless the field of intellectual property
concerned was the subject of E.U. harmonization. Therefore, in the absence
of harmonization, the Commission must assume, for the sake of the
proceedings in question, that the intellectual property in question is valid.
Furthermore, once the Commission has presumed the existence of a
valid copyright, Magill and its progeny would then require that the
Commission examine mainly whether the complainant is correct in arguing
that access to the material in question is indispensable. In short, the
applicable test under Article 82 is clearly "blind" as to the nature of the
intellectual property concerned, as well as to the degree of originality,
intellectual labor, or financial investment embodied in the respondent's
"work." If the Commission discriminated among different classes of
intellectual property, or even within a single class, deeming that access to
some works may be ordered under Article 82, while others are beyond its
19 See, e.g., Korah, supra note 9, at 813. It will be recalled that the Commission is not
authorized, pursuant to Article 295 of the EC Treaty, to interfere with national institutions on
questions of property ownership. A limited application of Article 82 to banal works has
been viewed as a practical, though imperfect, legal means for the Commission to circumvent
questionable national copyright legislation or court rulings, and thereby, to permit the
copyright in question to be exploited (albeit not as a work in the public domain) by third
parties.
20 id.
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scope of application, this would throw into serious question the integrity of
the Commission's competition analysis.
Third, if the Commission were seeking, even indirectly, to discredit the
copyright determination of the relevant national authority, the outcome of
the Commission's case should be that the material in question is in the
public domain, rather than a finding that the parties must negotiate terms of
access, or failing that, the terms would be imposed by the Commission. It
would be incongruous for the Commission, on the one hand, to disparage
the validity of the copyright in question, and on the other hand, to claim that
the putative copyright owner is entitled to a royalty for the exploitation of
the underlying work.
Lastly, commentators who would limit compulsory licensing under
Article 82 to cases of doubtful copyright argue, as justification for this
limitation, that such a circumscribed application of Article 82 is acceptable
because it does not cause dilution of intellectual property. However, this
begs the question of whether the application of Article 82 to more valuable
intellectual property is likely to cause any significant intellectual property
dilution. In this respect, it was already discussed earlier that no evidence
has been presented, as yet, which indicates that the Commission's
application of Article 82 to valuable intellectual property in any form would
damage intellectual property.
The acceptance of compulsory licensing under Article 82 to remedy
bad copyright determinations might well result in a public service in that it
enables the Commission, to some extent, to weaken the copyright owner's
grip over material that it should not, in all fairness, be his exclusive right to
exploit. However, this tolerated use of Article 82 to achieve an agenda
which is not even intended by the case law, and which may unwittingly
draw the Commission into an infringement of Article 295, is not helpful for
elucidating the relevant issues. A more straightforward antitrust-driven use
of Article 82 is not only better suited for achieving the same objective; as
noted earlier, it is actually the only legal means, under E.U. law, to compel
access to "essential" intellectual property.
IV. ADEQUACY OF SAFEGUARDS
The use of Article 82 to compel intellectual property licenses is
inherently just as capable as any other type of infringement of the EC
competition rules of being abused by the Commission in terms of the laxity
of the legal test employed or the manner in which it is enforced, as well as
in the severity of the sanctions imposed (in this case, an intellectual
property license, rather than a Commission fine). Due to the sensitivities
involved in the compulsory licensing of intellectual property, it is
particularly important that adequate safeguards exist to protect against
abuse by antitrust enforcers.
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A. Indispensability and Alternatives
The central barrier to the abusive grant of access to intellectual
property is the legal test employed by the European Court. In the Bronner
judgment of 1998,21 the Court summarized the principles laid down in
Magill. As the Court noted, in any case involving the exercise of
intellectual property rights, it would be necessary for the party seeking
access to the intellectual property that it be "indispensable to carrying on
that person's business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential
substitute...., 2  Article 82 would not apply where there are no "technical,
legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even
unreasonably difficult... 23 to use an alternative to the intellectual property
in question.
Interestingly, none of the E.U. cases on essential facilities or
compulsory licensing of intellectual property has indicated that the license
applicant must satisfy an element of causation. But surely something akin
to such an element is implied by the requirement of indispensability in the
Article 82 "essential facilities" context. In other words, if indeed there is no
actual or potential substitute for the "facility" in question, common sense
would dictate that the license applicant show a foreseeable or likely effect
of some kind on its business where a license is denied. Otherwise, the
facility in question is not indispensable in any sense of the word. For
example, must the applicant demonstrate that it will go out of business? Or
would it suffice for the applicant to show that it will suffer a competitive
disadvantage of some kind?
In Bronner, the European Court affirmed the judgment in Magill by
concluding that Article 82, in the IP context, requires the license applicant
to prove that access to the intellectual Property in question is "indispensable
to carrying on that person's business. The Court in Bronner explicitly
linked the alleged essential "facility" in that case (Mediaprint's home
delivery system for newspapers) with actual or potential substitutes
available to Bronner for use on the relevant market (daily newspapers).
Bronner's case depended upon a showing of indispensability in relation to
the latter market. It was not necessary for Bronner to demonstrate that the
facility in question was indispensable to all of its activities.
21 Case 7/97, Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. 1-779 1.
22 Id. at para. 41
23 Id. at para. 44.
24 Id. at para. 41. In Magill, the refusal of the broadcasters concerned to license their
television listings to Magill prevented the company from publishing a comprehensive multi-
channel weekly guide. This refusal to publish did not, however, prevent Magill from ceasing
all of its publishing activities, and the Commission decision notes specifically that only
Magill's TV guide activities came to an end. Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43, at para.
5.
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Since it is only necessary to create an economic link between the
essential intellectual property and particular markets, the refusal to license
need only impact the license applicant's operability on those markets. This
is where Bronner makes perfect sense in stating the refusal to license must
"be likely to eliminate all competition [in the relevant market] on the part of
the person requesting...., 25  More accurately, in the absence of
discrimination, the refusal to license must have virtually the same effect on
all persons similarly situated. This point of view was also confirmed by
Magill, in which the Irish publisher Magill was engaged in publishing
activities other than weekly TV guides. Neither the Commission nor the
EC courts held, as a condition to the application of Article 82, that Magill's
entire publishing business needed to fail or that the broadcasters' refusal to
license only affect Magill vis-A-vis the publication of weekly TV guides.
Rather, the Court found it was crucial that the broadcasters, by denying
access to an indispensable raw material (daily TV listings), "reserved to
themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding
all competition on that market....26
In accordance with Magill and Bronner, one may conclude that the
refusal to license, in the absence of additional conduct or discrimination,
cannot breach Article 82 unless there is at least likelihood that all
competition in the relevant market will be eliminated as the result of the
refusal. Does this mean that the license applicant must prove that he will
either be prevented from entering the relevant market without access to the
essential intellectual property, or, if he is already active in the relevant
market, must he prove that he will be forced to withdraw from it?
Alternatively, Magill and Bronner could be construed as providing a test
which does not require evidence of an absolute bar to entry (or forced
market exit), but rather, a test which could also be fulfilled where the
applicant is able to remain active on the relevant market, albeit as a
marginal player due to having been placed at a competitive disadvantage
vis-A-vis the owner of the essential intellectual property.
A review of EC case law demonstrates that neither the EC courts nor
the Commission has required that the refusal to license is capable of
infringing Article 82 only when the applicant is foreclosed, in absolute
terms, from the relevant market. Indeed, if such a drastic effect were
required in essential facilities cases, it would place refusals to license on an
unequal footing with other forms of exclusionary abuse under Article 82.
To the contrary, as the Commission stated in Sea Containers v. Stena
Sealink,27 the first Commission decision in which "essential facilities" is
specifically referred to, the dominant firm's imposition of a "competitive
25 Id.
26 Id. at para. 56.
27 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 18.
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disadvantage" on a competitor is sufficient for purposes of establishing the
harmful effects of the abuse.28 In that case, the Commission referred to
Hoffinann-La Roche,29 one of the leading cases on refusals to supply, in
which the Court, in the context of a refusal to supply, held that the abuse
must have "the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.,
30
However, it should be noted here that Article 82 might only catch a
dominant firm's refusal to license when all of the competitors of the
dominant firm are placed at a competitive disadvantage, not simply the
license applicant. As Advocate General Jacobs indicated in Bronner, the
test is an objective one .3  The competitive disadvantage created by the
dominant firm's withholding of access must therefore be structural in
nature. A license applicant would be unable to plead that a denial of access
would cause its activities in the market to be "particularly vulnerable, 32
where, for example, the company is lagging behind its competitors in
technology or cost efficiencies in manufacturing.
There is a temporal aspect to the above issue. If all competitors are
incurring a competitive disadvantage as the result of a denial of access,
there is an issue as to how long this disadvantage must last. The above-
cited passage from Hoffmann-La Roche seems to suggest that the disability
is not capable of coming within Article 82 unless it lasts long enough to
damage the structure of competition in the relevant market. This is also
suggested by both Magill and Bronner, in which the test of indispensability
was made incumbent upon the existence of actual or potential substitutes
for the "facility" in question. Until now, neither the EC Courts nor the
Commission has explicitly read the language of potential substitutes as
involving a temporal element, but the Commission appears to recognize that
short-term disabilities need to be examined with great caution due to their
likely inability to affect the structure of competition. What does matter,
therefore, is whether the disability is likely to last long enough to harm
competition.
The above approach might be inferred from the IMS case, in which the
Commission granted an interim license to NDC despite the fact that the
1860 brick structure industry standard, which constituted a mere
segmentation of German territory by postal codes, was capable of being
replaced by the very German pharmaceutical industry that adopted this
standard. What mattered to the Commission was that in the relevant market
in which the 1860 brick structure constituted the applicable industry
28 Id. at paras. 66-67.
29 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
30 Id. at para. 30.
31 Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, at para. 51 (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs).
32 Id. at paras. 51, 66.
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standard, NDC and other competitors of IMS risked being foreclosed from
the German market in regional sales data reports. As the Commission
confirmed in its interim decision,33 there was no sign that the German
industry standard was about to change. This would imply that if, in the
course of the investigation, the Commission had learned that the German
pharmaceutical industry was planning to replace the 1860 brick structure as
the industry standard within the next few months (which was not the case),
the Commission might well have stayed its investigation. This approach
would have been consistent with the Hoffmnann-La Roche formula as to the
nature of the "effects" required to establish an abuse under Article 82.
In fast-moving technology-driven markets, the problem is that today's
essential facilities and intellectual property may be replaced rather quickly.
This poses an issue for the Commission, not just for determining the
duration of a compulsory license, but more fundamentally, for determining
whether such a license is necessary at all in order to prevent damage to the
structure of competition. Future potential substitutes, like present ones,
therefore, cannot be ignored. Indeed, future alternatives may be critical to
the analysis. At the same time, however, the Commission should not be
obliged to speculate as to whether next-generation technologies are likely to
go on-stream within time to save the competitive environment from
significant harm. It is therefore submitted that the relevant benchmark
should be whether, at the time of its investigation, the Commission is able
to identify, with reasonable specificity, imminent alternatives to today's
essential facilities that are capable of being implemented before damage is
done to the structure of competition in the relevant market.
There are two additional elements of the EC legal test that provide
safeguards against the abuse of intellectual property by compulsory
licensing. First, as discussed earlier, there must be no actual or potential
substitute for the "facility" in question. 34 From the point of view of the
incumbent dominant firm, potential substitution has not only a temporal
aspect, but also a supply-side economic element.3 5 In other words, the issue
here is whether there are any technical, legal or economic constraints that
make it impossible or unreasonably difficult to use alternative facilities. If
such alternative facilities exist and they are available to all competitors of
the dominant firm, then it would appear that Article 82 would not be
infringed by this firm's refusal to license. The issue of adequate substitutes
was central to the NDC v. IMS case, in which the Commission found that
while it was "theoretically possible" for NDC and other competitors to
implement an alternative to the 1860 brick structure (which would not have
resulted in a risk of copyright litigation), there were a number of factors
" NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401, at para. 89.
34 See Korah, supra note 9, at 813; Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791.
35 Korah, supra note 9, at 813.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:619 (2004)
which made this an "unviable economic proposition:,
36
(1) With an alternative brick structure, it would have been impossible
for the pharmaceutical firm to compare the performance of its drugs with
those of its competitors and to reward sales representatives.
(2) A change in brick structure would have disrupted relationships
between sales representatives and the doctors that they routinely visited
because only the 1860 brick structure would have succeeded in maintaining
those relationships.
(3) An alternative brick structure would have compelled the
modification of employment agreements between the pharmaceutical
companies and their sales representatives, due to the change of the
representative's sales territory.
(4) A change in brick structure would have necessitated the costly
modification of existing software used by pharmaceutical companies.
(5) The pharmaceutical companies indicated that the 1860 brick
structure was the German industry standard, and that any brick structure
failing to conform to this standard was "hardly marketable.,
37
(6) The only brick structures that could be used economically by
pharmaceutical companies were those based on postal codes, and this
placed limits on the design of new alternative brick structures.
(7) There were data protection concerns surrounding the use of an
alternative brick structure because by superimposing a second brick
structure over the 1860 brick structure, by a process known as triangulation,
one might be able to identify purchases of particular drugs by a certain
pharmacy.
(8) There were legal uncertainties for pharmaceutical companies in
using any alternative brick structure, particularly if it were similar to the
1860 brick structure.
It should be clear from the factors listed above that the elements of
indispensability and absence of suitable substitutes bear a resemblance with
the paradigm of refusal to supply as established in Commercial Solvents,38
the central case relied upon by the Court in Magill. In each situation, there
is a refusal by a dominant firm to supply, or to provide access to, an input
which is deemed essential to the party denied supply (or access), resulting
in the elimination of competition.
However, there are important differences between the refusal to supply
situation embodied by Commercial Solvents and the essential facilities
scenario. The Commercial Solvents paradigm involves the cutting off of
supplies of an essential raw material to an existing customer in a secondary
36 NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401, at para. 92.
37 Id. at para. 128.
38 Case 6/73, Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
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market, eliminating competition from the latter in the market for the
finished goods, thereby enabling the supplier of the raw material to leverage
its dominant position in the raw material into the market for the fi,al
product. By contrast, in an essential facilities case, the firm seeking access
to the facility in question is prevented from entering the relevant
(downstream) market.39  More importantly, in the essential facilities
context, market leveraging is not required, whether the essential facility
involves infrastructure or intellectual property. In fact, as seen in Magill,
Bronner0 and IMS, the refusal of access to the "facilities" concerned was
(or would have been) intended to preserve the incumbents' dominant
position on the entrenched market relying upon the facility, rather than to
facilitate the dominant firm's entry into a secondary market.4 1 For example,
in Magill, it was plain from the judgment of the European Court that the
broadcasters concerned, by refusing to license their daily listings to Magill,
were simply seeking to protect the viability of their own-channel guides,
which arguably would have come under attack from Magill's multi-chanqel
guide. There was no evidence whatsoever, at any stage of the Magill saga,
which suggested that the broadcasters concerned withheld access from
Magill in order to publish a multi-channel guide of their own, whetder
separately or jointly.
Nevertheless, the critical point is that as in the Commercial Solvents
scenario, the denial of access to an essential facility by a dominant firm is
predicated on actual or potential market foreclosure. In each situation,
whether the object of the withholding is raw material or a "facility," there is
no effective alternative, and as a consequence, competition is neutralized.
These factors demonstrate that the essential facilities doctrine rests largely
on time-honored and tested legal concepts under EC competition law. The
legal test applicable to essential facilities would therefore appear to be
neither arbitrary nor controversial.
B. New and Improved Products: The Intellectual Property Dimension
A concern of IP owners is whether the application of Article 82 to
impose compulsory licenses of intellectual property opens the door to IP
dilution by permitting free riders to appropriate the novelty or investment
39 Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, at para. 48 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs citing
the famous port cases).
40 The hypothesis here is that Bronner required access to Mediaprint's distribution
system, which was not in fact the case.
41 In Bronner, the leading newspaper in question, Mediaprint, would have refused access
to preserve its position in the daily newspaper market. It would not have refused access to
leverage its dominant position into any secondary market. Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791. In
NDC Health, the motivation of IMS would have been to prevent NDC from gaining access
to the market in regional sales data services, which IMS virtually monopolized. NDC
Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401.
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embodied in the protected work. In other words, could Commission and
Court policy, as expressed in Magill, Bronner and more recently, in IMS, be
viewed as undercutting the Volvo' 2 and Renault43 judgments of 1989?
In both Volvo and Renault, the Court established that the mere refusal
by Renault and Volvo to license their design rights in certain body panels,
absent additional conduct, cannot in itself constitute an infringement of
Article 82 where the licensee intends simply to reproduce and sell copies of
these proprietary body panels on a gray market for these panels." In other
words, the exploitation of these design rights by the complainants would
have vitiated the IP rights that Volvo and Renault enjoyed over these
particular original replacement parts. Even if the complainants were able to
establish that they required a license to these design rights in order to make
legal copies of these body panels, Article 82 could not be applied to
undermine the very subject matter of intellectual property. There was no
balance struck between the interests of intellectual property and competition
where the complainants sought to introduce competition on a market that
Volvo and Renault, as a matter of intellectual property, has a legal right to
monopolize. As Advocate General Mischo noted, the only competition
eliminated by the refusal to license was competition from companies
"producing imitation parts., 45 The Commission stated at the hearing that
the complainants did not argue (let alone establish) that they operated in a
market for independent producers of auto parts, and that they could not
compete in this market absent a compulsory license.4 6
The Volvo-Renault cases therefore demonstrate that, even before the
Commission decided Magill, the Court was thinking that in certain cases
the interests of competition law may outweigh the interests of IP owners,
such as where an IP owner attempts to assert its IP rights in an input facility
in order to monopolize a market which is not itself within the scope of IP
protection. In order to strike a balance between intellectual property and
antitrust, as Advocate General Jacobs suggested, a compulsory license "can
be justified in terms of competition policy [where] the dominant
undertaking has a genuine stranglehold on the related market. ' '47 This
thinking was applied, for example, in Magill, in which the Commission and
EC Courts held that the broadcasters' copyrights in daily TV listings did not
legally entitle them, under Article 82, to monopolize the U.K. market in TV
magazines.4 8 Likewise, in the IMS case, the Commission rejected the IMS
42 Case 238/87, Volvo v. Veng, 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
43 Case 53/87, CICRA v. Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039.
44 See Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. 6211, at paras. 7-9.
45 Id. at para. 60 (Opinion of Advocate General Mischo).
46 Id. at 6051 (Report for the Hearing).
47 See Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, at para. 65.
48 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43. This is an implicit result of the conclusion that
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argument that its putative copyright in the 1860 brick structure entitled it to
monopolize the market in regional sales data services.4
In both Magill and IMS, the Commission .and the EC Courts
scrupulously avoided any acknowledgment that they were applying the
essential facilities doctrine in an intellectual property context. The fact that
this omission was deliberate is troubling because it leaves compulsory
licensing, as a matter of EC competition policy, in an ambiguous policy
framework. 50 Advocate General Jacobs summed up this ambiguous policy
in the Bronner case:
It seems to me that intervention of that kind [i.e. compulsory licensing],
whether understood as an application of the essential facilities doctrine
or, more traditionally, as a response to a refusal to supply goods or
services, can be justified in terms of competition policy only in cases in
which the dominant undertaking has a genuine stranglehold on the
related market.
51
What then discourages the Commission and the EC Courts from
bringing compulsory licensing within the framework of essential facilities
doctrine? A review of the leading Magill judgment of the European Court
provides us with a plausible explanation. The Court indicated that
mandatory access to intellectual property, pursuant to Article 82, could only
be justified in "exceptional circumstances. 52 The Court expressly based its
test of exceptional circumstances on Volvo and Renault. The test of
Magill could not be legally prevented, by enforcement of U.K. copyright laws, from
becoming the sole competitor of the three broadcasters concerned in the market for weekly
TV guides.
49 NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401. In fact, during the investigation IMS conceded that,
even assuming that it held a valid copyright in the 1860 brick structure, the copyright's
alleged exclusive rights did not entitle it to monopolize the relevant market in regional sales
data services.
50 However, in a preliminary reference to the European Court by the Frankfurt Regional
Court presiding over the IMS copyright litigation, Advocate General Tizzano seemed to
acknowledge that at least some of the cases involving refusal to license intellectual property
may have invoked the essential facilities doctrine. See NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401
(unpublished opinion of Advocate General Tizzano), at para. 47, available at http://
atlas.pharmalicensing.com/features/disp/1067456033_3faO162198382 (last visited Feb.
2004).
51 Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, at para. 65. In the above quotation, Mr. Jacobs makes a
reference to "the related market." Although this remark is made within the context of the
compulsory licensing of intellectual property, one finds the same or similar language (such
as "secondary" market) in traditional essential facilities cases. Therefore, the two-markets
issue should not be viewed as one which distinguishes the compulsory licensing of
intellectual property under Article 82 from traditional essential facilities doctrine, assuming
for this purpose that the existence of two markets were necessary in these contexts. We will
revisit the two-markets point later in this paper.
52 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43, at para. 50.
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exceptional circumstances was a means for the Court to find that the mere
refusal to license, in the absence of additional abusive conduct, may
constitute an abuse of dominant position for the purposes of Article 82. All
of the special circumstances identified in Magill fell squarely within the
doctrinal parameters of essential facilities, except for one. In Paragraph 54
of its judgment, the Court stated:
The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by relying on
national copyright provisions thus prevented the appearance of a new
product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programs, which
the appellants did not offer and for which there was potential consumer
demand. Such refusal constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the
second paragraph of Article 8[2] of the Treaty.
The above "new product" language found in Paragraph 54 of the
Court's judgment, which was also present in the underlying Commission
decision in Magill, had no precedent in EC competition law. The facts of
Magill provided grounds for the Commission and the Court to distinguish it
from Volvo and Renault, where the complainants simply sought to exploit
protected auto part designs by manufacturing and marketing cheap
replacement parts.53  Magill, after all, was not intending to use the
broadcasters' copyrights simply to market copies of the broadcasters'
weekly own-channel guides. This aspect of Magill had an obvious
consumer interest appeal in it: at the time, the United Kingdom was one of
the few Member States in which multi-channel guides did not exist, and this
fact could have been attributed to the peculiar workings of the 1956
Copyright Act,54 which allowed the broadcasters to assert a copyright over
their own daily listings. Without the intervention of competition law, a
state-controlled authority would have been necessary to facilitate the
compulsory licensing of listings if a weekly multi-channel guide were ever
to appear on the British market. The consumer interest aspects of Magill
were expressly acknowledged by the Court in Paragraph 54 of its
judgment.
However, Paragraph 54 of the Court's judgment also posits Article
82(b) as a basis for the broadcasters' infringement, alluding specifically, to
the portion of sub-paragraph (b) concerning the limitation of markets.56
This suggested that the essential facilities aspects of Magill might have
53 See e.g., Case 76/89, ITP v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, at para. 59. The CFI
analogized Magill's activity to that of "an independent repairer carrying on his business on
the derivative market of automobile maintenance and repair."
54 See Copyright Act, supra note 16.
51 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43.
56 Id. This is suggested by the court's language that the refusal to license "prevented the
appearance of a new product..."
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been the predominant feature of the Court's analysis.
This leads to an interesting question: was the "new product" language
from Magill solely fact driven, or did it amount to a significant element of
the Court's legal test for determining when the refusal to license, standing
alone, may constitute an infringement of Article 82? 57 If the former, was
the Court's reference to Article 82(b) the real key to the outcome of Magill,
with the effect that the broadcasters' refusal to license enabled them to
monopolize the market in weekly television magazines in which both own-
channel and multi-channel guides would have competed?
It should be noted that the "new product" language from Magill did
not amount to an intervention on the part of the Commission and EC Courts
into matters involving the existence or merits of intellectual property, as
this would have been prohibited by Article 295 of the Treaty. In fact, in
order to apply Article 82 to the refusal to license, in the absence of other
abusive conduct, the Commission and EC Courts must at least assume that
the party refusing to license owns the intellectual property concerned as a
matter of national law. However, there has been a traditional distinction
made by the Court between the "existence" and "exercise" of intellectual
property rights, with the former being within the exclusive province of the
national authorities and the latter being potentially limited under
Community law.58 According to Court precedents, the exercise of IP rights
may be limited by overriding Community interests, such as the free
movement of goods.
The problem facing the Commission and EC Courts in Magill (and
later in IMS) was that, purely as a matter of national copyright law, it made
no difference whether the party seeking a compulsory license intended to
use the input concerned (daily TV listings in Magill; the 1860 brick
structure in IMS) simply to make a slavish copy of what the putative
licensor already produced and put onto the market or intended to make a
derivative product which differed from the licensor's product to some
degree. In either fact situation, as a matter of national copyright law, the
party using the copyright would be deemed to have committed an
infringement of copyright and would not have had authority to reproduce
and market a work incorporating the input. This is consistent with requests
for a compulsory copyright license under Article 82, in which the
Commission and EC Courts have not directly challenged, nor sought to
57 Some commentators have posited that the factors listed in Magill as evidence of
exceptional circumstances also constituted the elements of legal test which might apply in
other factual settings. See e.g. Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States:
Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 409, 462 (2001).
58 For a review of this traditional thinking, see, e.g. Case 69/89, RTE v. Commission,
1991 ECR 11-485, at paras. 67-73.
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vitiate by indirect means, the findings of any national court on the issue of
copyright infringement.
Rather, the "new product" language from Magill is a creature of EC
competition law. This was the meaning of the Court of First Instance in
Magill, where, after laying down the new product element in language that
was later virtually replicated by the European Court in Paragraph 54 of its
judgment, the CFI stated that, "[c]onduct of that type... clearly goes beyond
what is necessary to fulfill the essential function of the copyright as
permitted in Community law.",59  The CFI refers in vague terms to
"Community law" because there are precedents prior to Magill in which the
Court has subordinated the interests of national copyright law to
Community interests covered by the EC Treaty, such as the Treaty
provisions on the free movement of goods. Obviously, however, in Magill
and IMS, the sole and overriding Community interest was competition.
There are three factors that support the view that the predominant issue
for the Commission and EC Courts, in deciding whether to impose a
compulsory license, is whether the refusal to license will foreclose
competition on the relevant market, within the context of Article 82(b):
First, the Commission in Renault noted that the complainants in that
case had failed to assert that a market existed for the independent
manufacture and sale of auto parts, such as presently exists in the United
States as represented by such chains as Pep-Boys.60 The Commission
therefore suggested that the mere copying of Renault body panels may have
been justified under Article 82 if a license were necessary to compete in
such a derivative "market." 61 There would have been, additionally, a
consumer interest in the development of such a market, in that consumers
would have had access to a generic market in body parts that still does not
exist in Europe.
Second, the Court in Magill held that Volvo and Renault authorized the
application of Article 82 in "exceptional circumstances," without stating
explicitly that the circumstances present in Magill were exhaustive.62 In
other words, the Magill test could have been interpreted not only as
supporting the Commission's argument in Renault, as to the potential
justification for a compulsory license in a market for the independent
manufacture of auto parts, despite the absence of a "new product;" it was
also plausible that the Court in Magill supported compulsory license on the
ground that access to the daily TV listings by Magill was essential for it to
compete on the market in weekly TV magazines, and that the development
of this market was foreclosed by the broadcasters' refusal to permit Magill
59 Id. at para. 73.
60 Case 53/87, CICRA v. Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039
61 id.
62 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43.
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to market a multi-channel guide. Seen in this light, the essential facilities
aspects of the case provided the core rationale for the Court's ruling, and
the presence of a "new product" was only an additional factor that weighed
in favor of applying of Article 82. In fact, the approaches of the CFI in
Ladbroke63 and the Court in Bronner64 were consistent with this reading of
Magill.65 The Commission also read Magill in this manner in the IMS case,
where Article 82 was applied without any consideration whatsoever to
whether NDC intended to market a new product.66 Indeed, the Commission
relied entirely on essential facilities grounds in ordering a license.
Third, the seeds for a market-limitation approach are inherent in the
weak definition of what constitutes a "new product" for the purposes of
Article 82. We know from Magill that a new product, for the purposes of
the compulsory licensing of IP rights under Article 82, did not require the
applicant's use of the license to enter a product market upon which the
licensor was not active. 67 The relevant market was defined as the market in
weekly television magazines, upon which the broadcasters' own-channel
guides and Magill's multi-channel guide would have competed.68 This
vitiated the significance of novelty considerably, because it meant that an
improved product would have constituted a "new" product.
However, if Article 82 could be applied to compel IP licenses that
constitute essential facilities irrespective of whether the applicant sought to
introduce a "new" product, on the ground the refusal to license resulted in a
limitation of markets, where would that leave Volvo-Renault, which
provided an important safeguard for owners of intellectual property?
Neither the Commission nor the EC Courts are suggesting that if Volvo and
Renault had been decided today, the applicants should be entitled to a
compulsory license on the ground that their access to Volvo and Renault
panel designs is "indispensable" for the production and marketing of these
two manufacturers' original body panels.
Advocate General Tizzano grappled with these difficult issues in the
preliminary reference to the European Court by the German trial court
presiding over the IMS copyright litigation against NDC. In his view, the
balance between intellectual property and antitrust (and hence the
protection of the principles established in Volvo and Renault) was not struck
by permitting a compulsory license to reproduce an identical version of the
63 Case 504/93, Tiercd Ladbroke v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 11-923, at para. 131.
64 Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, at para. 41.
65 In support of this view, see Temple Lang, The Principles of Essential Facilities in
European Community Competition Law-The Position Since Bronner, 1 J. NETWORK
INDUSTRIES 375, 376 n.2 (2000).
66 NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-340 1, at para. 70.
67 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43.
68 id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:619 (2004)
product marketed by the party refusing to license.69 Rather, he posited,
Article 82 required that the product of the license applicant have other
features or characteristics that, even though the product competed with that
of the right holder, responded to the needs of consumers that were not met
by the existing product. In short, he opined that the new or improved
product factor in Magill was not simply a helpful but unnecessary adjunct
to the essential facilities core of the Court's reasoning, but rather,
constituted a key aspect of the "exceptional circumstances" test.70
In this author's view, Advocate General Tizzano has not resolved the
IP/antitrust conflict by proposing a test of additional characteristics. As
long as the party seeking a compulsory license does not copy the product of
the market incumbent (who owns the essential facility), 71 it is the
indispensability of access to the input facility on a market which is not the
subject of intellectual property, rather than the novelty of the licensee's
product, which should determine whether it must be licensed pursuant to
Article 82. Novelty is likely to follow from the existence of competition.
Whether the novelty is attributable to the market incumbent or to the
licensee is actually irrelevant. The role of the Commission should be to
create the competitive conditions in which innovation might take place.
Mr. Tizzano's test of additional characteristics, if adopted by the
Court, would give rise to a Pandora's box of enforcement difficulties. For
example, must the additional characteristics or features involve the manner
of functioning of the product, or can they involve improvements in
interoperability, medium, formatting, appearance or product safety? What
if the improvements are not in the physical manifestation of the product, but
rather, inherent in vastly more efficient manufacturing processes, which
make the product affordable to a much wider group of consumers? It is not
clear how Mr. Tizzano would address these questions, but it is clear that a
test based on additional product features could deny consumers the benefits
of other improvements that may be entitled to IP protection. The denial of
access to an essential facility that is IP-protected, in these contexts, would
not only discourage competition but allow the owner of the essential facility
to use its intellectual property as a blocking patent or copyright to prevent
innovation.
Secondly, a test of additional characteristics leaves the Commission, as
grantor of a compulsory license, in an unusual predicament. There can be
no discrimination, pursuant to Article 82, when there is a blanket refusal by
the owner of the intellectual property to license anyone. Assuming that the
69 NDC Health, supra note 50, at para. 65 (unpublished opinion of Advocate General
Tizzano).
70 id.
71 The copying of the incumbent's final product could well amount to a separate
intellectual property infringement.
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grant of a compulsory license was predicated on the licensee's proof that his
product has characteristics not present in the incumbent's product, it would
appear that the licensor would not be required to license all subsequent
license applicants, but rather, each of those who demonstrate to the licensor
that they intend to market a product with additional characteristics. This
would place a burden on the licensor to vet the novelty of each and every
license applicant. But it is submitted that the licensor would be ill suited to
make such licensing decisions. Moreover, despite his good faith, the
licensor's wrong determination on the worthiness of the entrant's product
could result in actionable discrimination. This prospect would either induce
the licensor to provide licenses on request, or induce the licensor to refuse
licenses, which could lead to a multiplicity of complaints or lawsuits filed
by prospective licensees. Neither scenario is appealing or necessary.
Lastly, Mr. Tizzano's proposed test does not account for the use of an
IP-protected essential facility for use in a neighboring market that is not
based upon improvements in the IP-protected product. The example
offered by the Commission in the Renault hearing comes to mind here: if
there were a market for the independent manufacture and sale of auto parts,
should Volvo and Renault be permitted to exercise their IP rights to prevent
such parts specialists from carrying on their business? This is indeed the
implication of Mr. Tizzano's Opinion, and if the Court adopted his view, it
would provide legal authorization for other automakers to act similarly,
thereby foreclosing the viability of this neighboring market.
Clearly, what the Court in Volvo-Renault intended to address was the
use of Article 82 by free riders. More precisely, these two judgments
supported the proposition that Article 82 cannot be applied simply to allow
third parties to reproduce what they cannot achieve legally as a matter of IP
law. Mr. Tizzano's criterion of additional features will distract the
Commission (and from May 2004, the national competition authorities and
courts) from the critical question of whether the owner of the essential
facility, by asserting its IP rights, is able to control an entire market which
is rightfully outside the ambit of its IP protection.
V. THE "Two MARKET" CONUNDRUM
The issue of whether leveraging from one market to another is
necessary in any essential facilities case under Article 82, even when
intellectual property is involved, received much of its intellectual currency
from the Magill Court, which made an association between Commercial
Solvents and essential facilities in the IP context. The famous language in
question is found in Paragraph 56 of the Magill judgment:
Third, and finally, as the Court of First Instance also held, the appellants,
by their conduct, reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly
639
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television guides by excluding all competition on that market (see the
judgment in Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents v.
Commission [ 1974] ECR 223, paragraph 25) since they denied access to
the basic information which is the raw material indispensable for the
compilation of such a guide.
72
The conundrum arose from the fact that the three broadcasters
concerned, the BBC, ITV and RTE, licensed newspapers and certain
magazines to publish their daily TV listings, free of charge, for one or two
days. This practice was clearly promotional in character, and was
apparently intended to entice the newspaper reader to purchase the
broadcasters' own-channel weekly TV guides. As the Commission noted,
this practice also enabled the three broadcasters to protect their position in
respect of their individual weekly TV guides because such limited short-
term publishing of lists by the newspapers did not compete with the
broadcasters' own-channel weekly guides.7 3 The "trade" in the daily
listings could therefore be analogized to the availability of a 15-second
promotional clip of a song which one can play, without charge, in a music
store (or on-line site, such as Amazon) before deciding whether to purchase
the CD that incorporates the song. In each situation, the TV listings and
audio clips are not traded on a market, but rather, they are distributed free of
charge in order to promote products into which they are incorporated, i.e. an
own-channel weekly TV guide and a full length CD, respectively.
Prior to Magill's request for a license to use the three broadcasters'
weekly listings in a comprehensive multi-channel weekly TV guide, there
was no market in the daily listings that might be analogized to the raw
materials that were the subject matter of Commercial Solvents. In this
earlier case, Commercial Solvents was the dominant manufacturer of
nitropropane and aminobutanol, the principal raw materials for the74
production of ethambutol specialty drugs. There was a market in these
raw materials because they were sold to third party producers of
ethambutanol, and this accounted for Commercial Solvent's market share
and market power.75 By contrast, until the emergence of Magill as a TV
guide publisher, the three broadcasters concerned had no market shares in
their own TV listings because the commercial use of the listings was
limited to incorporation into their own-channel magazines. It is also worth
noting that when Magill began publishing its weekly TV guide, it used the
broadcasters' daily listings without their permission76 and was subject to
72 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43, at para. 56.
73 Id. at para. 23.
74 See Commercial Solvents Corp., 1974 E.C.R. 223, at para. 7.
75 d.
76 Magill TV Guide, 1989 OJ (L 78) 43, at para. 5.
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copyright infringement proceedings during this time. Therefore, the
"market" in daily TV listings-and indeed Magill's TV guide-operated at
best, as a gray market.
Lastly on the issue of market leveraging, as is well known to
competition scholars, Commercial Solvents leveraged its dominant position
in raw materials for ethambutol by refusing to supply the raw materials to
Zoja, himself a customer of Commercial Solvents and a manufacturer of
ethambutol. 7  This act, without more, would have constituted an act of
market foreclosure by preventing Zoja from remaining active in the
downstream market. Market leveraging arose, however, from Commercial
Solvents' more sinister reason for refusing to supply, which was not simply
to eliminate Zoja for its own sake, but rather, to facilitate Commercial
Solvents' entry into the same downstream ethambutol market, thereby
enabling Commercial Solvents to leverage its dominant position in the raw
materials into the downstream market for the final product.
The idiosyncratic market analysis that the Commission and EC courts
provided in Magill in respect to the daily TV listings was intended to
demonstrate consistency with Commercial Solvents. However, the
comparison broke down completely on the issue of market leveraging.
Unlike Commercial Solvents, in which a refusal to supply facilitated entry
onto a secondary market by exploitation of an unfair monopoly advantage
in the upstream market, in Magill, even assuming that there was a market of
some kind in daily TV listings, the broadcasters in question were not
leveraging their position on that market, or even their positions as
monopolist publishers of own-channel guides. Rather, they were using
their copyrights in TV listings solely to prevent the commercial extinction
of their obsolete own-channel guides. This conduct was more aptly
characterized as the foreclosure of a potential competitor, rather than the
leveraging of market power from one market to another.
It remains a mystery why the Commission and the EC courts have felt
an unswerving need to impose the Commercial Solvents paradigm on
essential facilities cases.78 If one could assume that the EC law of essential
facilities evolved from refusal to supply, there are some cases in which the
Commercial Solvents two-market approach may be suitable, as for example,
the current Commission investigation involving Microsoft's leveraging of
its position in desktop servers into the market in workgroup (low-end)
servers. However, Commercial Solvents provides an awkward, unsuitable
means of resolving essential facilities cases in which there is an input-
facility that does not function as a market, resulting in a single relevant
market that is the object of market foreclosure rather than market
leveraging. Other forms of refusal to supply are even less suitable for
77 See Commercial Solvents Corp., 1974 E.C.R. 223, at para. 16.
78 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 18, at 339.
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application to essential facilities situations.7 9
A Commercial Solvents line of analysis may therefore be helpful in
true two-market essential facilities cases, but it has proved inappropriate
and unnecessary for the examination of one-market cases. For the latter, an
approach based on simple market foreclosure is necessary.
If one assumed that there was only one relevant market in Magill, and
that this market was in weekly TV guides (with both own-channel and
multi-channel guides competing in this larger market), the case could have
been analyzed differently. The broadcasters had exclusive ownership and
control of their daily TV listings, an indispensable input for anyone wishing
to publish a weekly TV guide. Magill, wishing to compete with the
incumbent broadcasters in the market for weekly TV guides, which they
jointly monopolized, sought access to this input, but was denied access
because the broadcasters wished to maintain exclusive control over the
market in weekly TV guides. However, as the intent of the U.K.
government was not to confer on the broadcasters, pursuant to their
copyrighted daily TV listings, a veritable monopoly over the U.K. market in
weekly TV guides, a compulsory license was required for any market
entrant to publish a magazine that competed with those of the incumbents.
A market in the daily TV listings would have been unnecessary, as would
any requirement that the newcomer publish a "new product."
The Commission's interim decision in NDC Health/IMS Health8° took
a bold look at Commercial Solvents and various cases adopting the two-
market approach to essential facilities. On its facts, the IMS case was no
more capable of being intellectually squeezed into this paradigm than
Magill was. In IMS, as in Magill, a market in the 1860 brick structure
became possible only after the Commission had ordered IMS to license this
structure to its competitors, NDC and AzyX. 81 Even then, a market in the
1860 brick structure never arose because IMS obtained the suspension of
the Commission's order to license in the Court of First Instance.
Consequently, as in Magill, it would have been disingenuous on the
Commission's part to perpetuate, by application of the historical thinking,
that the 1860 brick structure constituted one of several relevant markets.
79 One of the landmark Court of Justice judgments involving refusal to supply under
Article 82 was Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, which involved
a refusal to supply bananas by a dominant producer in order to coerce the loyalty of a
distributor. There was no raw material or other input which was indispensable to the
distributor. Absent coercive action from United Brands, the distributor would have been
able to obtain his supply of bananas from third parties-in fact, the distributor's seeking of
bananas from a third party producer is what caused United Brands to discontinue supplies.
"' NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401.
81 IMS went beyond even the three broadcasters in Magill by allowing third parties (other
than its competitors) to use the 1860 brick structure subject to no licensing conditions
whatsoever.
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Fortunately, the Commission concluded that the 1860 brick structure
constituted an essential facility "input"; 82 the Commission did not deem it
necessary to determine whether the 1860 brick structure constituted a
relevant market. The only relevant market was the German market in
regional sales data services, in which IMS held a near total monopoly. By
asserting a copyright in the 1860 brick structure, which also constituted the
industry standard for Germany, IMS intended to preserve its quasi-
monopoly in regional sales data services. By imposing a compulsory
license on these facts, the Commission concluded that this form of market
exclusion was just as capable of falling within the ambit of Article 82 as the
leveraging of a dominant position in a raw material into second market for
the final product.
Although the Commission weakened the umbilicus between
Commercial Solvents and the essential facilities doctrine, it appears close to
being severed completely. Advocate General Tizzano, in his Opinion in the
IMS reference from the Frankfurt Regional Court, stated that in Magill and
Bronner, the Court recognized that it had affirmed the existence of markets
in daily TV listings and home delivery schemes for newspapers,
respectively, even though these products or services were not traded on the
market. Seeming to concede that these determinations were based more on
historically accepted theoretical constructs rather than on economic reality,
Mr. Tizzano acknowledged that:
[W]e must recognize that one cannot dismiss the applicability of the case
law on refusing to conclude [a licensing] agreement merely because the
undertaking seeking a license to the brick infrastructure intends to
operate on the same market as the copyright holder. Specifically, when
one considers that the question is based on the assumption that the brick
infrastructure for which a license is being sought is indispensable in
order to market studies on regional sales of medicinal products in a
particular country, one can immediately identify an upstream market for
access to the brick infrastructure (in which the copyright holder has a
monopoly) and a downstream secondary market for the sale of those
studies. 83
Mr. Tizzano thereby suggested, "to follow the case law," 84 in an
essential facilities case, it is permissible to conjure a theoretical "market" in
the essential infrastructure, even when it is not a market in fact. It was
sufficient, in Mr. Tizzano's view, that the infrastructure operated as a
82 NDC Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401, at paras. 184-85.
83 NDC Health, supra note 50 (informal translation from original German text of
unpublished opinion of General Tizzano).
84 Id. at para. 57.
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"potential" market. It was no consequence, in his view, whether the firm
owning the infrastructure "opts not to market the relevant input
performances separately (although real demand exists) but merely to use
them on a downstream market so as to limit or exclude competition from
that market entirely.
85
Between the lines, Mr. Tizzano suggests that in order to remain
consistent with the Court's precedents, it is acceptable in true one-market
cases to treat the "market" for the essential infrastructure in the same way
that it has been treated by the Court, i.e. as a fictitious market, or, more
aptly, to use his terminology, a "potential" market.
The use of this construct by Mr. Tizzano avoids at least one awkward
situation: if we assume that in Magill, there was no market in daily TV
listings and that no broadcaster was active on the market in weekly TV
guides of any kind, but that Magill wished to open a wholly new market in
such TV guides with his own multi-channel magazine, what would be the
relevant market? Could Magill avail himself of Article 82 to compel a
license to the broadcasters' daily TV listings? As regards the relevant
market, the fact that no one operates on it should not prevent a "pipeline"
market from existing (although the pipeline product would be introduced by
the license applicant). As regards the second question, in the absence of a
concrete, economic market in the essential facility or in the downstream
product, the reservation of the downstream market for the sole exploitation
of the owner of the essential facility is just as anti-competitive a situation as
when the same owner does in fact use his ownership of the facility to
exploit and monopolize the downstream market. A compulsory license
should be available in this instance.
The above approach is consistent with the Commission's guidelines
for access in the telecommunications sector. In short, the owner of an
essential facility or infrastructure has an obligation under Article 82 to
allow access to service providers where there are no feasible alternatives
available:
Refusals in this case would therefore limit the development of new
markets, or new products on those markets, contrary to Article
8[2](b) .... Given the pace of technological change in the
telecommunications sector, it is possible to envisage situations where
companies would seek to offer new products or services which are not in
competition with products or services already offered by the dominant
access operator, but for which this operator is reluctant to provide
access... a company may abuse its dominant position if by its actions it
prevents the emergence of a new product or service.
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VI. ESSENTIAL EASEMENTS
This paper has shown that the EC legal precedents support the notion
that the essential facilities doctrine, including its application to intellectual
property, is applicable in both one-market or two-market cases, either to
address market foreclosure or leveraging, or both. In either situation,
Article 82 is available to prevent situations in which a dominant firm asserts
the ownership of the essential facility (or intellectual property) to exclude
all competition on the relevant market. With regard to intellectual property,
the only qualification is that the market from which a competitor is being
excluded must not fall within the very subject matter of the IP right, with
the effect that if the intellectual property does not entitle its owner to
monopolize a derivative or neighboring market, Article 82 may be applied
to prevent the application of IP rights to achieve such a position.
There is another dynamic in the essential facilities scenario that should
not be ignored. Article 82 is not intended to provide rights akin to those of
real estate easements where right of way is necessary to preserve the value
of one's property or business. This is not within the scope of EC
competition law. Rather, the dynamic that constellates in the essential
facilities context is the denial of access to an essential facility by a
dominant firm to prevent market entry by an actual or potential competitor.
As the Court indicated in the Telemarketing case,8 7 the dominant incumbent
firm may, by refusing access to the facility, be reserving an activity either
for itself or for another undertaking in the same corporate group. It is
submitted that this logic should be extended to prevent the reservation to an
essential facility for an independent firm that has close economic links with
the owner of the facility.
VII. CONCLUSION
The EC law of essential facilities, and its application to intellectual
property, is becoming ingrained in the fabric of EC competition law and
enforcement. It is not likely that the clock will be rolled back, or that
Commission officials responsible for policy direction will find that the
doctrine is extraneous, i.e. that refusal to supply provides sufficient legal
cover for the issues presented in essential facilities scenarios. If this paper
has shown anything, it is precisely that efforts to force essential facilities
into the Commercial Solvents paradigm are a recipe for policy confusion
and a contorted analysis.
Looking forward, it will be incumbent upon the Commission and the
EC Courts to better define the functioning of the essential facilities
doctrine, and in particular, how it shall be applied to intellectual property.
the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C 265) 2, at paras. 88-90.
87 Case 311/84, CBEM v. CLT, 1985 E.C.R. 3261.
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This paper has sought to address some of the shortcomings that now exist in
the law as it relates to the compulsory licensing of intellectual property
under Article 82.
Some commentators will probably believe that legislation is the
medicine needed, and that legislators (and intellectual property regulators)
are in a better position to deal with the anti-competitive application of IP
rights by removing IP status for undeserving works, shortening the duration
of IP protection, carving out exceptions to exclusive rights and dealing
more effectively with blocking patents and copyrights. A recent report
published by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission would seem to take this
view.88 However, it is one thing for the legislator to prevent unwarranted
market power by granting unwarranted patents, but it is quite another for
the antitrust regulator to refuse to act when valid intellectual property is
abused by dominant firms. The European Commission has stepped up
rather courageously to the task. In the case of the U.S. federal antitrust
authorities, the abdication of such issues to the Patent and Trademark
Office provides a strong indication of how far the pendulum hanging over
intellectual property and antitrust has swung in favor of the former in the
current Administration.
Other commentators, including this author, believe, however, that
antitrust regulators have an important role to play in this debate. Given the
speed of technological advancement, it is arguably asking too much of
legislators, without the assistance of the antitrust bar, to predict when IP
rights granted in one year may become an impediment to competition and
innovation in later years. The debate will no doubt continue, but it is also
time for antitrust regulators and legislators to work together to address the
concerns that are already upon us.
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88 FTC, PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY 37 (2003). For a view advocating a more robust U.S. antitrust policy, see
Pitofsky, supra note 4.
